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Abstract 
This paper presents some evidence on the current state of the banking system in Chile, with particular 
focus on the adjustments it must undergo to comply with the Basel II Capital Accord. We present some 
basic facts about the Chilean banking system and a brief international comparison. We consider 
separately local banks, the country’s publicly owned bank and foreign banks, and present the 
evolution of some basic indicators of performance. The evidence shows some important efficiency 
gains over time. We also examine issues like the changing procyclicality of banks’ lending and the 
changes in capital requirements which will result from the adoption of Basel II. The Chilean banking 
system is well prepared to implement Basel II, albeit in a gradual way. 
I. Introduction 
The development of the banking system over the past few decades has played a major role in Chile’s 
macroeconomic performance. Similarly, the macro-financial stability that has characterized the 
economy during this period has enhanced the presence of banks as a source of financing, and has 
allowed an increasing diversification and flexibility in banks’ loans, especially in the retail sector. On 
the other hand, exposure to credit, liquidity and market risks has remained limited, and more recently 
banking regulation has moved gradually towards a modern approach to risk assessment, in line with 
Basel II.  
Until the mid-1980s, Chile was characterized by having a deep but poorly regulated financial system. It 
was not until the banking crisis of 1982-83 that some major financial reforms were introduced, building 
a sound financial regulatory framework that has remained at the core of the Chilean banking system 
up until now. Like other economies, during the 1990s Chile saw an important process of bank 
consolidation plus a steady incorporation of foreign banks. These two factors were crucial in improving 
operating efficiency and, with the sole exception of the Asian crisis aftermath, contributed to a process 
of increasing bancarization. During the last several years, competition among banks has increased, as 
the net interest margin has gradually narrowed and the higher willingness to lend has brought more 
financing alternatives to the retail market. 
Prudential regulation has also improved. Since Basel I was implemented in Chile, banking regulation 
has progressively adopted a modern risk-management approach. According to the road map designed 
jointly by the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) and the Central Bank, the 
gradual implementation of Basel II is expected to reduce capital requirements in the short term. 
Although these results are sensitive both to risk-weighted parameters and to operational risk, capital 
adequacy ratios are expected to remain high. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some key features of the Chilean banking system during the 
past two decades. Section II describes the conditions under which the 1986 General Banking Law was 
established, starting from a brief description of the banking crisis of the early 1980s. Section III 
describes some characteristics and the evolution of the Chilean banking system during this period. It 
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also addresses issues such as the presence of foreign banks, the role of the State and the more 
recent impact of monetary policy on the credit channel. Section IV deals explicitly with capital 
regulation and its implications for procyclicality. Section V concludes. 
II. General  background 
In the late 1970s, Chile went through some major trade and financial reforms. The banking system 
was liberalized, leading to the elimination of controls on credit and interest rates and to bank 
privatization. However, this process lacked prudential regulation, which, in conjunction with the fixed 
exchange rate regime in place at the time, led to a rapid increase in bank credit to the private sector, 
especially to the non-tradable goods sector. Therefore, although there was no currency mismatch in 
the banking system’s balance sheets, there was a mismatch in the sector banks were lending to 
(Cowan and De Gregorio, 2005), setting the stage for the country’s worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression.  
During the late 1970s, domestic credit grew at an annual average rate of 40%, thus increasing banks’ 
proportion of GDP from 8% in 1975 to 35% in 1980. The lack of supervision and regulation of banks 
during this period became evident when they began to take excessive risks, as credit to related parties 
reached 19% of total loans in 1982. There was also a presumption that the government would bail out 
the banking sector - a bank had been saved in the late 1970s and there had been public statements 
by the authority on the need to avoid bank failures - which contributed to banks’ moral hazard 
problems and set the scene for the banking crisis that ensued. Actually, even though the deposit 
insurance system introduced in 1977 and 1981 was limited in scope, depositors behaved as if their 
deposits were fully guaranteed, searching for high returns without taking into account the risk involved. 
Therefore, banks increased their credit exposure and became extremely vulnerable to macroeconomic 
conditions. In fact, the external shock that hit in 1982, combined with the weaknesses of the Chilean 
banking system, along with the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime, led to a deep currency and 
banking crisis. As a result, unemployment soared to almost 20% while GDP fell by 14% in 1982. Non-
performing loans also went up to 9% of total lending in 1985 and banks’ profits turned into losses of 
US$671 million. This led to a costly banking system intervention by the Central Bank, estimated at 
about 35% of GDP.
2 
As a consequence of this crisis, from 1983 to mid-1986, the authorities established a fully guaranteed 
demand and time deposit insurance scheme in order to prevent a bank run. Therefore, it was not until 
late 1986 that the general process of recovery actually began, leading to a new banking regulation 
framework. The General Banking Act (GBA), introduced at the end of 1986, set the basics for 
resolving the fundamental problems that had caused the crisis of 1982: improving supervision and 
prudential regulation by restricting lending to related parties and limiting the State guarantee on 
deposits.
3 The GBA’s original basic framework is still in place, and is considered to be at the core of 
the current strength of the Chilean banking system. Additionally, the amended GBA of the 1990s 
upgraded the banking legal framework introducing capital adequacy requirements in line with Basel 
standards, and allowed banks to expand their activities and invest overseas, helping to consolidate 
and develop the banking system even further. 
Besides the banking system reforms described above, the evolution of the banking sector during the 
past 20 years has benefited from the developments in the Chilean capital market that have taken 
place since the late 1980s. Furthermore, the whole financial system has taken advantage of the 
Pension Funds Reform of the early 1980s and of the sound fiscal policy that has characterized this 
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period. All this has increased the supply of long-term funding, helping to expand the banking system 
and other financial institutions, such as the domestic stock market, financial intermediaries and 
institutional investors (pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies, among others).
4 
These developments have consolidated a solid financial system, making it comparable to those of 
other developing economies, as shown in table 1. In fact, as expressed by Moody’s, the strength of the 
Chilean banking system is rated at the top among emerging markets and at a similar level to many 
industrial countries. The fifth column of table 1 shows a financial strength index for a variety of 
countries worldwide.
5 Chile is ranked at a similar level to some industrialized countries, like Italy, and 
















Latin America       
Argentina  12 62  6 10  0 
Brazil  33 36 32 10 24 
Chile  75  86  10  19  58 
Mexico  18 18 21  3 42 
Colombia  23  15 3 0  24 
USA  174 118 121 113  77 
Europe       
Italy  83 37  121 44 63 
France  88 67 85 42 73 
Germany  117 37  129 43 47 
Spain  111 71  157 24 77 
Czech Rep  30 18 52  7 41 
Poland  28 15 27  n/a 31 
Asia       
Japan  105 60 87 44 21 
Korea  120 48  235 50 18 
Malaysia  132  141 34 53 35 
Philippines  35  40 9 0  19 
Sources: World Bank, Moody’s. 
 
When taking into account indicators of the financial sector’s size,
6 like private credit as a percentage of 
GDP, Chile is ranked almost as high as some developed countries, such as France and Italy (75% vs. 
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88% and 83%, respectively), and well above other Latin American economies. Stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP is also high in Chile, above Spain, France, Germany, Japan, 
and all the other Latin American countries. However, turnover ratios are still relatively low, which 
indicates that the market is not as liquid as could be expected given the degree of capitalization. 
The development of pension funds has also allowed Chilean firms to resort to domestic funding. Firms 
have been able to switch from foreign financing to internal and long-term loans. This has resulted in a 
healthier financial structure of Chilean corporations. As shown in figure 1, the Chilean corporate bond 
market grew from US$2.2 billion in 1995 to US$6.8 billion in 2002. Also, more recently, the low interest 
rates and low credit risk that have characterized financial markets around the world have forced 
institutional investors to reallocate their investment portfolios in search of higher yields. As a result, 
corporate bond stocks increased to US$10.1 billion in 2003, and to US$13.0 billion in October 2005. 
Figure 1 
Corporate Bonds 














Source: Superintendence of Securities and Insurance. 
Therefore, as has been shown, the Chilean financial system has reached a high degree of 
development during the last two decades. 
III.  The Chilean banking sector: Where do we stand? 
This section briefly addresses some of the important changes experienced by the Chilean banking 
system during the last two decades. We begin with a description of the current structure and the 
evolution of the banking sector and then examine the new risks faced by the financial system. 
III.1 Structural  changes and performance 
The structure of the Chilean banking system has undergone deep changes in the past decades, 
characterized by significant entry of foreign banks and an increasing presence in retail credit. 
Currently, there are 26 banks established in Chile: 14 of them, one of which is state-owned, are BIS Papers No 28  167
 
considered “domestic” and the other 12 are either branches of foreign banks or mainly controlled by 
foreigners.
7 Although the number of banks (both domestic and foreign) in Chile has decreased 
substantially since 1990, the market share of foreign banks has increased substantially in recent years 
(table 2), giving them a major role in the domestic and credit market. By the beginning of 2005, they 
accounted for almost 40% of total assets (equivalent to US$41 billion), compared with 16% in 1990, 
and 22% in the mid-1990s. 
Table 2 
Evolution of the Structure of the Chilean Financial System 
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
Foreign banks 22 12 15.2 39.0 16.3 39.4
Local private banks 17 13 66.5 47.7 64.1 44.2
State-owned bank 1 1 18.2 13.2 19.6 16.3
Number % total loans % total deposits
 
Source: SBIF. 
The consolidation process that took place mainly between 1995 and 2002 heightened the degree of 
bank concentration. Presently, the three largest banks in Chile account for approximately 54% of total 
loans, and 55% of total deposits. This process of consolidation, however, has followed a similar pattern 
to that in other countries,
8 and has not prevented higher bank penetration and global integration. 
Actually, the increasing role played by foreign banks in Chile has improved the efficiency and quality of 
financial risk management, laying the groundwork for enhanced competition through the introduction 
of technological innovations. Banks’ funding structure has also diversified, contributing to financial 
stability.
9  
Tables 3 and 4 show some characteristics of the Chilean banking system for two different sample 
periods: 1990-99 and 2000-05. During this latter period, foreign banks became relatively more 
important in Chile. The two tables also classify each institution according to its ownership origin: 
private domestic, state-owned and foreign. As can be seen from table 3, interest rate margins have 
narrowed recently in all categories of banks, but profitability has remained high. The decrease in 
interest margins reflects not only higher competition, but also improved efficiency and lower credit risk. 
Efficiency has increased significantly while overhead costs as a percentage of net operational income 
has approached 50% in both private domestic and foreign banks.  
The asset composition of the banking sector has moved towards retail credit. Loans to households 
have increased substantially over the last five years, mainly due to the strong growth in mortgage 
loans. Foreign banks have been particularly aggressive in this development, as almost 30% of their 
total loans are now aimed at the household sector, including personal loans, credit cards and 
mortgage loans. 
In the search for higher returns, banks have eased lending conditions to the household sector. Higher 
flexibility in payment plans, longer loan maturities and the higher share of variable-interest-rate loans 
in the banks’ portfolios have facilitated the process of bancarization in the retail market. It is important 
to note that financial stability has not been jeopardized by this process, since economic conditions and 
expectations have improved during the last few years, and interest rates have reached historical lows. 
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Table 3 
Performance of Foreign and Domestic Banks in Chile 
 
1990-99 2000-05 1990-99 2000-05 1990-99  2000-05 
Net interest margin (% of total assets)  5.0 3.9 4.6 3.3 4.1  3.7
Overhead cost (% of total assets) 3.2 2.6 3.2 2.9 3.0  2.6
Overhead cost (% of net operational income)  55.2 52.8 62.3 65.8 62.0  51.5
Loan-loss provisions (% of total assets)  0.9 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.7  0.9
ROA  1.8 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.9  1.6
ROE  25.5 17.6 10.2 9.4 7.6  16.7
Capital adequacy ratio  12.2 12.2 16.0
Asset structure 
72.8 76.1 58.2 32.5 60.3  68.3 % Loans to total assets 
17.8 20.7 36.5 45.5 18.4  27.0 % Household credit to total loans 
% Consumer to total loans  7.5 8.4 4.0 7.1 8.0  9.6





On the liabilities side, time deposits remain the most important source of financing (more than 40% of 
total assets), and their relative importance has even increased in the past few years, as more 
resources are now being channeled from institutional investors (particularly mutual funds) to the 
banking industry in the form of deposits. However, the banking system has also adjusted its funding 
structure over the past few years. In particular, the recent record-low levels of interest rates have 
allowed banks to adapt their financial structure in favor of issuance of long-term banking debt 
instruments (table 4).  
Table 4 
Foreign and Domestic Banks in Chile: Sources of Funds 
Percentage of total assets 
 
Above all, the Chilean banking industry has remained sound and profitable compared to other 
countries (figure 2). Its capital adequacy ratio (CAR) averaged 13.5% between 2000 and 2004, and all 
banks maintained a CAR higher than 10%, a figure well above the required minimum of 8%. 
Profitability has also remained high and stable, with the only exception being the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis. The average return on equity (ROE) in this period was 15.6%, in spite of the decrease in 
net interest margins. In fact, net interest margin, the main source of bank profitability, declined from 
4.4% to 3.2% of total assets between 1996 and 2005 (figure 3). However, this decrease was partially 
offset by lower provisions and higher operational efficiency, allowing profitability to remain high. 
1990-99 2000-05 1990-99 2000-05 1990-99 2000-05
Short-term treasury funding (*)  -5.9 -9.9 -32.7 -29.1 -14.4  -15.1
Time deposits  40.2 46 36.5 40.8 37.3  42.7
Demand deposits  9.1 10.9 17.6 16.4 8  9.8
Fixed-income securities  13.2 15.2 18.7 24.7 8.6  16.7
Others 15.4 14.9 11.1 8.4 19.1  15.9
(*) Includes net interbank funds, external lines less cash and securities.
Domestic Foreign 
Private State-owned
Source: Authors’ calculations using SBIF data.  BIS Papers No 28  169
 
Figure 2 
Capital Adequacy and Return on Equity 
























Source: National Authorities. 
Figure 3 
Monetary Policy Rate and Banks’ Interest Margin
1 














net interest margin *
 
1    Before August 2001, nominal equivalent monetary policy rate is estimated 
(see footnote 10).  
(*) Percentage of total assets. 
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The nominal equivalent monetary policy rate has fallen steadily since 1996,
10 allowing the bank-
lending rate to drop significantly during this period. In fact, the average interest rate earned by banks’ 
assets decreased from almost 12% in 1996 to less than 6% in 2004. Although pass-through from the 
monetary policy rate and the banks’ market rates has not been full, the Chilean banking system 
exhibits high flexibility in its bank-lending rate compared to other countries (see Berstein and Fuentes, 
2003). 
More recently, interest rates have started to increase as the Central Bank of Chile has begun to 
reduce the degree of its monetary policy expansion. However, the average interest rate has remained 
at a historical low, allowing bank loans to continue growing. 
III.2  New forms of risk  
As described above, the changes faced by banks, as well as the macroeconomic environment in 
which they have operated, have resulted in exposure to new and more complex forms of risk. 
Increased market volatility, contagion among financial markets, and increased competition among 
financial intermediaries are some of the factors that have contributed to these changes. This section 
briefly highlights some of the new forms of risk faced by banks and the financial regulation and 
infrastructure initiatives undertaken by the authorities in order to limit their incidence. 
Contagion through the payment system 
The payment system is an essential component of the economic and financial infrastructure, because 
it allows secure and prompt completion of transactions, a key condition for good economic 
performance. However, the payment system can also bring risks to its participants, and it can be 
transformed into a channel that spreads financial problems from one agent to the market at large. This 
possibility of transforming individual risk into systemic risk is related to the appropriate functioning of 
the payment system and constitutes a fundamental concern for central banks. Given that the volume 
of interbank operations in Chile has grown during the past several years, interbank payment risk 
exposure has also increased, adding new risks to the banking system. As a consequence, a series of 
initiatives to modernize the payment system have been adopted with a view to augmenting its 
efficiency and security. One of these initiatives was the implementation of real-time gross settlement 
and the Domestic Currency Large-Value Payments Clearing House (see Working Group on Payment 
Systems, 2003). 
Increased use of derivatives 
Derivatives allow banks to improve their management of market, credit, liquidity and operational risk. 
These instruments include a variety of financial contracts, such as forwards, futures, swaps, and 
options.
11 Although the use of derivative instruments is not new to the banking industry, their volume, 
complexity, and diversity have grown significantly in the past few years, adding new challenges to 
adequate risk management.
12 In this regard, banking supervisors have tightened control of bank 
operations with derivatives, and promote healthy practices such as: appropriate supervision, an 
integral process of risk management (sensible limitations, continuous measurement and information 
procedures), and internal controls, as well as an adequate measure of the capital base.
13 For that 
reason, in Chile, in order to ensure proper administration and control of market risk associated with the 
use of derivatives, sensitivity and volatility parameters used by banks must be authorized by the SBIF. 
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development and enhancement of the Chilean capital market, and expanding the supply of currency and interest rate risk 
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sets out a methodology to measure the risk related to positions in options. BIS Papers No 28  171
 
Risk transfers 
Recently, banking institutions have developed a growing number of mechanisms to transfer risk. 
Among others, the development of securitization and credit derivatives has favored the transfer of 
banks’ operational and credit risks to other agents. Also, the increasing use of variable interest rates in 
mortgage contracts has shifted interest rate risk to households, transforming it into a bank credit risk, 
as households’ payment ability decreases when interest rates increase. Consequently, banking 
supervisors have to be aware of the risks involved in each type of operation. 
In this regard, a new regulatory framework was approved in January 2005. The new regulations gave 
banks better means of identification, measurement, and control of interest rate and currency risks. 
This new framework incorporated international standards and recommendations, such as the 1996 
amendment to Basel I, and the 2004 recommendations on the administration and supervision of 
interest rate risks incorporated in Pillar II of the New Capital Accord (Basel II). It also allows the 
quantification of risks associated with maintaining open positions on options, and limits the exposure 
of available capital once the charges associated with credit risks are deducted. 
Managing liquidity risk 
In Chile, banks have faced additional challenges regarding their liquidity risk management due to the 
differences in their asset composition, and the growing presence of institutional investors in their 
funding structure (see Jara and Winkler, 2005). As a result, new norms on liquidity risk management 
were introduced in 2004 to promote better management, measurement, and control of liquidity risk. 
According to this new regulation, and in line with international standards, financial institutions now 
have to adopt and implement a “liquidity management policy” aimed at ensuring proper payment of 
obligations, not only in normal conditions but also in exceptional circumstances. 
IV.  Capital regulation: present and future 
In the context of the new Basel II framework, two key issues are (i) whether implementing this new 
capital arrangement will result in less or more stringent capital requirements and (ii) the behavior of 
capital requirements across the business cycle. The first issue is relevant to evaluating the ability of 
the banking system to intermediate. The second is important because procyclicality of banking 
activities could make banks cut back on lending during recessions, amplifying the cycle. These and 
other issues related to the implementation of Basel II are examined in this section. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to look at the facts. The literature has emphasized the concern that 
financial systems are extremely procyclical. Since risk is defined in many countries by accruals rather 
than by forward-looking criteria, banks tend to behave procyclically, i.e. reducing lending during 
recessions, which makes credit markets very volatile. In fact, if loans are perceived as risky only when 
the loss is already realized, banks will only start to build up capital to buffer such loss when it is too 
late. Therefore, given that losses are exacerbated during recessions, it is more costly to buffer them 
than during booms, so bank lending contractions have the potential to worsen the cycle. 
Therefore, we should expect to find high procyclicality in the data. We measure procyclicality as the 
correlation coefficient between private credit and GDP (rho). As shown in figure 4, which includes 
developed and developing countries, most countries are concentrated in rho values from -0.5 to 1. 
However, most countries show a positive correlation. In fact, Latin American countries’ correlations 
vary from -0.4 (Argentina) to 0.5 – 0.6 (Paraguay and Venezuela) and 0.8 (Chile). Figure 4 plots the 
correlation coefficient against GDP growth, from 1990 to 2004, using annual data. As shown in the 
figure, there is no relationship between the procyclicality of the banking system and GDP growth. As 
we argue below, because the banking system is more vulnerable during recessions, credit may, for 
prudential reasons, contract, while from a stability standpoint an expansion of credit would be 
desirable. This tradeoff is what could explain the lack of clear relationships between procyclicality and 
growth. Further explorations of the possible patterns followed by procyclicality are depicted in figures 5 
to 7.  172  BIS Papers No 28
 
Figure 4 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using IMF data. 
Figure 5 plots bank strength and the correlation coefficient, rho, showing that there is no correlation 
between these variables. Stronger banking systems are neither more nor less procyclical than weak 
banking systems. We explored other evidence as well, which is not documented here, and obtained 
the same results with regard to lack of correlation between procyclicality of lending and variables like 
inflation, GDP volatility and others. 
Figure 6, in contrast, plots the relationship between procyclicality and credit market depth
14 for the 
same period (1990–2004), using annual data. It shows a positive correlation, i.e., procyclicality 
increases with deepness. Indeed, the banking systems in the most advanced countries, such as Hong 
Kong, Japan, the UK and Switzerland, are deeper, but also more procyclical. Interesting results are 
obtained for Latin American countries, which have less developed financial systems. According to the 
data in the graph, these countries should be less procyclical and, in fact, some of them even show 
negative indicators for procyclicality, like Argentina and Peru. However, other LA countries are highly 
procyclical, even if their banking systems are less developed. Examples of the latter are Colombia, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Guatemala. In these cases the banking system is neither a significant 
contributor to financing, nor to financial stability. Chile, in turn, is comparable to the US, showing high 
procyclicality (as do Switzerland and Hong Kong), though not as deep. 
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Figure 5 
Procyclicality and Bank Strength 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using IMF data; Moody’s (Dec 2004). 
Figure 6 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using IMF data. 
Figure 7 plots the volatility
15 of lending relative to that of GDP against the correlation coefficient 
between lending and GDP. As shown in the figure, correlation between both variables is slightly 
positive and mainly driven by countries such as Guatemala and Paraguay. In principle, one could think 
that it is precisely procyclicality which adds volatility to output, although this is not strongly supported 
by the simple evidence shown here. Moreover, a more comprehensive analysis should consider the 
procyclicality of all available forms of financing.  
Figure 7 
Volatility and Procyclicality in the Credit Market 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using IMF data. 
Although the correlations presented here suggest, in particular, that procyclicality is unrelated to 
economic growth and that it would tend to be higher in countries with deep banking systems, a more 
definite assessment would require a more detailed econometric analysis. The following sub-sections 
show the impact of Basel II on procyclicality and point out some interesting issues to consider when 
implementing the new framework in Latin American countries. 
IV.1  Expected impact of Basel II 
The Basel II framework promises key advances in risk management and banking supervision around 
the world. It represents a substantial improvement on the existing Accord, but it is much more than just 
a new formula for calculating regulatory capital. It provides a comprehensive structure for dealing with 
risk management and banking supervision, and seeks to attain best standards and practices.  
In the coming years, Basel II will become a global standard. It will be adopted by a great majority of 
countries: 88 out of 107 non G-10 countries have already expressed their intention to implement the 
framework. This high level of acceptance is common to all regions of the world. 
                                                       




























































































Rho (pr cred-gdp) 1990-2004BIS Papers No 28  175
 
The new framework requires fulfillment of certain prerequisites concerning the existing quality of 
regulation, supervision, and risk management. Prior to implementation, it will be necessary to establish 
an accurate diagnosis of the main issues already mentioned. In any case, a number of aspects must 
be examined, such as: the legal and regulatory framework; the supervisory system (risk-based vs. 
rules-based supervision); financial infrastructure (accounting and auditing rules); corporate 
governance in the banking industry; financial disclosure and market discipline. 
The New Accord seems to have positive effects for financial stability, thus buffering the cycle and 
diminishing the procyclicality shown in the section above. We estimate the potential effects that a 
Basel II type of approach would have on the Chilean banking system, and compare it with the current 
requirements of Basel I. We focus on two corrections of Basel II with respect to Basel I. First, we 
correct by the new weights of mortgages and, second, we weight corporate debt by risk classification. 
Specifically, we estimate the capital adequacy index under Basel II, and compare it with the index 
under Basel I for the 1996-2005 period.  
We use disaggregated information on rating agencies’ rankings (as a proxy for the banks’ internal 
ratings that will be used for the IRB approach
16) to convert them into a probability of default (PD), 
using a fixed correspondence following Kashyap and Stein (2004).
17,18 The PDs are mapped into 
capital charges using the Basel Committee’s formula. Then we use the same companies’ level of debt 
with the banking system. Under this exercise, a corporate borrower may have a lower capital 
requirement than the current minimum of 8% if rated above BBB. If the corporate loan is not rated it 
will continue to maintain the minimum 8% charge. 
Figure 8 shows that capital adequacy ratios would be higher under Basel II, thus reducing capital 
requirements.  In addition, the correlation between capital adequacy ratios and GDP declines from 
-0.51 under Basel I to -0.60 under Basel II, supporting the thesis that improving risk management and 
bank supervision should diminish procyclicality of lending. In any case, as argued by Held et al. 
(2004), although Basel II could reduce minimum capital requirements, these results depend on the 
assumptions and weights used. However, when using assumptions and weights closer to the Chilean 
market experience, capital gaps tend to narrow. In addition, we do not incorporate operational risk into 
our calculations,
19 which would reduce the procyclicality of capital requirements as operational risk 
declines in periods of low economic activity. In any case, since Chilean banks hold high levels of 
capital,
20 the impact of Basel II is not significant. 
One important issue arises regarding the risk classification of corporations: there is a clear disincentive 
for a corporate borrower to be rated if the rating is likely to be a poor one. This potential bias toward 
good ratings is more significant in Latin America, because the rating business is less developed, so it 
is not currently available for every firm. Ratings are usually associated to firms that issue public debt, 
typically corporations that are stronger financially. This bias, plus the fact that the majority of banks’ 
portfolios are currently unrated, implies that this approach does little to link bank capital to risk. 
The standardized approach also includes (not considered in the exercise above, except for 
mortgages) a set of specific changes in the Capital Accord that affects, in particular, the capital 
requirements on mortgages, retail exposure, lending to the sovereign in local and foreign currency, 
and lending to other financial institutions. Since it introduces lower charges on the first three 
(mortgages, retail exposure and sovereign), we would observe a larger reduction in capital 
requirements than the one presented here. 
                                                       
16   Although the most relevant options for developing countries are the standardized approach and the simplified standardized 
approach, we use the IRB, which is supposed to show higher reductions in capital requirements, so we are overestimating 
the effect of Basel II on capital. 
17   The mapping is as follows: AAA corresponds to a PD of 0.01%; AA to 0.03%; A to 0.07%; BBB to 0.23%; BB to 1.07% and 
B to 4.82%. 
18   We use standard mapping because of lack of data. Nevertheless, probabilities of default should be underestimated with this 
exercise. 
19   The introduction of a specific capital charge for operational risk is made under Basel II. This will be an add-on to capital 
required for credit risk. 
20   Only one bank reduces the capital adequacy index marginally below 10% when extreme conditions are assumed. 176  BIS Papers No 28
 
Under Basel II, the risk weight for mortgage loans is reduced. Lending to the banks’ own sovereign in 
domestic currency is free of charge, but lending in foreign currency requires weighting the loan 
according to the sovereign rating. Lending to other banks may increase capital requirements 
significantly, which allows a 20% risk weight charge if the loan term is shorter than six months. 
Figure 8 
Capital Adequacy Indexes 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SBIF data. 
Some critics have argued that a cut in capital requirements may end up increasing vulnerability, 
hindering the recovery of defaulted credit. This criticism may have some relevance in the case of 
Chile. According to the World Bank (2004) Chile is weak in the recovery rate on business closures, 
with only 19 cents recovered for each dollar lost. The top 30 countries in the World Bank’s ranking all 
have recovery rates above 50 cents on the dollar. This illustrates Chile’s ineffective bankruptcy 
procedures. Moreover, the legal formalities related to doing business are relatively slow. Retail credit 
is highly concentrated and, therefore, there is a potential systemic risk that is not considered for capital 
requirements. The key for estimating the impact of Basel II has to do with the empirical effects of these 
potential risks. If we consider that the capital charge due to operational risk will reduce adequacy 
ratios, for most banks this should offset the effects of raising capital requirements due to the kinds of 
credit risk just illustrated: low recovery rates on business closures and concentration. In addition, as 
we argued above, it is unlikely that Basel II will affect capital requirements materially. 
The latter issue is reinforced by international evidence for Latin America, such as Powell et al. (2004) 
and IADB (2005), which has shown a limited impact of Basel II implementation in the region. In Chile, 
for example, the QIS 3 exercise performed by the SBIF and documented in Held et al. (2004) yields 
that banks will reduce their capital requirement by approximately 3 percentage points (see table 5). 
These computations include operational risk. Only foreign banks will increase their capital requirement 
due to the higher impact of operational risk. In other Latin American countries (e.g., Brazil), the capital 
requirement will also decrease (0.9%). Only in Peru and Colombia will the capital requirement 
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Table 5 
Impact of the New Capital Accord 
 
Source: Held et al. (2004). 
 
Therefore, going from Basel I to Basel II will require no big increase in capital, and the rise in the cost 
of capital due to a higher capital requirement will be limited. As shown in Powell et al. (2004), the 
spread may only experience a significant increase in Ecuador and Venezuela. 
IV.2  Difficulties in implementing Basel II 
Some problems that developing countries will encounter when implementing Basel II include: credit 
risk underestimation, overvaluation of credit risk mitigants (guarantees and collateral), under-
provisioning, absence of capital charges for market risks, underestimation of capital requirements, 
accounting rules not aligned with international standards and lack of consolidated supervision. As 
suggested by White (2006), a heightened degree of cooperation between all agencies of government  
- and even private ones  - would help to build a common culture, which would facilitate the solution of 
the problems mentioned above.  
Asset risk varies over the business cycle. Risk assessment, whether based on credit rating agencies’ 
rankings or internal ratios, reflects this procyclicality, possibly more so in the case of internal ratings, 
which typically do not attempt to assess risk “through the cycle”. This procyclicality in ratings will 
create a similar procyclicality in capital charges, with the implication that banks hold less capital at the 
peak of the cycle  - exactly when the danger of systemic crises is largest
21  - while they will hold too 
much capital or under-lend during the downturn when macroeconomic stabilization calls for an 
expansion of credit. Consequently, regulation not only renders bank crises more likely to occur but 
could also destabilize the whole economy by exaggerating fluctuations. This is why countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies are needed. 
However, Latin America’s capital markets remain underdeveloped, imposing an important restriction 
on the full implementation of Basel II: greater penetration of rating agencies and provision of adequate 
information are needed to strengthen regulation, which is also needed to allow the full implementation 
of the New Accord. 
There is not only a shortage of rating agencies in Latin America, covering a small percentage of banks’ 
total loans (table 6), but also a lack of regulation. Furthermore, the quality of rating agencies’ credit risk 
estimates is uncertain. 
                                                       








Established banks in Chile  7 -13.4 10.2  -3.2
Foreign banks’ branches  - -11.6 12.6  1.0





In any case, the costs of implementing Basel II may be low, due to the active presence of foreign 
banking in a relatively concentrated system. 
V. Concluding  remarks 
The Chilean economy has gone through a process of financial development with a sound banking 
system during the past two decades. By most international as well as historical comparisons, the 
banking sector’s performance has been good. In the context of banking consolidation, as has occurred 
in many other countries, interest rate margins have declined and efficiency has improved. This has 
happened for all local and foreign banks and for the country’s state-owned bank. Only foreign banks 
have increased returns in recent years, although the evidence shows that this is due to a reduction in 
costs.  
Overall, the greater participation of foreign banks has brought efficiency gains. However, we should 
also mention the contribution of the one state-owned bank, whose performance is comparable to that 
of the rest of the banking system, but which has also acted as a promoter of competition. This has 
been particularly important in the household sector and with small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Perhaps the only important concern banks are facing today has to do with the greater exposure 
coming from the household sector. The banking system has also shown a response to monetary policy 
in line with the behavior observed in industrialized countries. 
We have shown that when computing simple correlations between bank lending and output, the figure 
obtained for Chile appears to be relatively large. This would indicate high procyclicality. Although 
volatility is moderate, the evidence on procyclicality could indicate that the banking system could 
extend the amplitude of the business cycle. However, there are two caveats to this conclusion: first, 
these are simple correlations and more statistical analysis would be required to check the robustness 
of this finding; second, and more important, bank lending is not the only source of funding for the 
corporate sector. As we have shown, there has been an important development in the bond market in 
Chile, which could offset  - or explain  - the relative contraction in credit during the downturn. More 
research needs to be done to evaluate the implications of the behavior of the financial system for the 
business cycle. 
One of the main criticisms of Basel II is that its application could exacerbate procyclicality, which in 




Percentage of total loans 
granted to rated firms 
Argentina 4 24.4
Bolivia  2 Non-significant
Brazil  5 18.0
Chile  4 18.0
Paraguay 0-
Peru 4 Non-significant
Uruguay  3 Non-significant
Source: Central Bank of Chile.BIS Papers No 28  179
 
that the implementation of the New Accord should diminish capital requirements and procyclicality 
should be reduced.  Additionally, operational risks should stabilize capital requirements via their 
countercyclical effect. Measuring operational risk is always complex, especially in developing 
countries, thus giving another reason for careful analysis. In the case of Chile, we presented evidence 
that the banking system has tended to hold more capital than required, which should reduce the 
impact of the changes in the index of capital adequacy over the cycle. We have argued that the 
Chilean banking system is on solid ground to follow a gradual implementation of Basel II. 
From a stability point of view, one might prefer banks to expand lending during recessions. But this 
could be achieved only at the cost of increasing financial vulnerability. Indeed, regulation should be 
forward-looking, but downturns generally bring bad news about the future; hence, it is reasonable to 
expect more cautious behavior and tighter regulation during downturns. At a deeper level, it is not the 
banking system that is in charge of stabilizing the economy. Indeed, what is required is a set of sound 
fiscal and monetary policies. In Chile, the fiscal rule based on a stable cyclically adjusted fiscal 
balance, together with an independent central bank with the goal of maintaining price stability, which it 
implements through an inflation target and a flexible exchange rate, have proved to be a good cushion 
for the business cycle. 
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